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VOLUNTARY PLANT CLOSINGS AND WORKFORCE
REDUCTIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS
Professor Antoine Jacobs*
The situation in Holland might be just the opposite of the situation
as sketched by our American colleagues because Holland has seen,
in the last 10 years, a great number of developments that have
produced more and more law in the field of labor relations and have
brought several cases of managerial decisions before judges. This
situation started near the end of 1960 and was caused by the general
mood of democratization and participation that went through Western
Europe, for example, in May of 1968 in France. This affected in the
first place the works council legislation; the Act on Works Councils
of 1950 was tightened up very strongly in 1971' and again in 1979.2
It now obliges all enterprises of medium and large size to have a
works council and to consult that works council for all economic
and social decisions, such as investments, pensions, and dismissals.
In 1979, an article3 was added to this Act which gave works councils
the right to object before the Court of Amsterdam when management
fails to follow the advice of the works council. This Court, however,
will control managerial decisions only on a very limited basis. It will
only quash a decision when it is utterly "unreasonable," so it reserves
for management a large scope of decisionmaking. But there are
already some cases in which the Court of Amsterdam has annulled
a decision of management. In addition, the works council may ask
the advice of experts even on the costs of management. So, if man-
agement wants to introduce computers or the like and the works
council questions the wisdom of that decision, the works council can
request a report by experts. The report may be very convincing and
cause the Court to reject management's decision.
It is important to note that if management does not take into
account this Works Council Act with all its obligations, the works
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council can seek redress before any judge in Holland and simply try
to stop the managerial decision. If the Act is actually neglected the
judge will not hesitate to grant an injunction.
This illustrates that in Holland we now have very severe controls
over the rules of the game. Certainly, judges cannot change the course
of the market; if a company is no longer viable, the judge cannot
keep it in business. But there are now rules requiring "decent man-
agerial behavior" and if management is not playing according to
these rules, the judges will not uphold managerial decisions. We have
had already ten or twenty famous cases in recent years which have
shown this. 4 So this is the first major development - the Works
Councils Act.
The second major development is the right to inquiry. In 1971,
the trade unions were given the right to initiate judicial inquiry into
managerial decisionmaking.i If managerial decisions qualify as "mis-
management," then the Court of Amsterdam can intervene and even
fire the directors of the company and nominate new directors for an
instant period, according to this right to inquiry.
The trade unions have used this right to go to the Court of
Amsterdam a few times. One of the famous cases arose when Ford
Motor Company, in 1981, wanted to close down its plant in Am-
sterdam. 6 The trade unions indeed went to the judges in Amsterdam
and asked for an inquiry. Was it really necessary for Ford to close
down its Amsterdam plant? Although Ford was not very cooperative,
it nonetheless furnished some information indicating that it could
not continue losing money in Amsterdam. There were also counter-
statements. For example, expert reports requested by the works council
and trade unions stated that it was Ford's policy to lose money in
Amsterdam. The question was rather difficult for the judges to decide
and they were lucky that the trade unions made arrangements with
Ford before they reached a decision. In the end the trade unions
accepted closure of the plant in exchange for payment of a certain
amount of money to the workers. This result occurred because Ford
exerted heavy pressure on the trade unions, stating it would simply
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stop pouring money in Ford Amsterdam, which would lead to bank-
ruptcy. Not a bankruptcy of Ford America, of course, but only
bankruptcy of Ford Amsterdam. And then the workers would have
no money at all. So Ford told the trade unions: accept money and
collective dismissal or there will be bankruptcy; ultimately, the trade
unions accepted the former. When, one month later, the court had
to make its judgment in the inquiry as to whether Ford Amsterdam
had shown "mismanagement," the decision had become meaningless
because the question had already been solved by the hard facts. So
the most famous case has not come to a very conclusive end from
a legal point of view, but it underlines my earlier statement that you
can have judges controlling the rules of the game but not judges
keeping open a factory when marketforces demand closure.
Professor Blanpain:
What about the Batco case?
Professor Jacobs:
Indeed, we also had the Batco case three years earlier, in which
the trade unions were more successful. The British-American Tobacco
Company intended to cease production in Amsterdam and concentrate
all Benelux production in Brussels. Again the trade unions used their
power to go to the judges and they succeeded; the judge temporarily
enjoined Batco Amsterdam from closing until the inquiry was com-
pleted. 7 It was not an unlimited order but an order for, at most,
one year. Batco had to accept the order and later, in consultation
with the unions, agreed to keep its Amsterdam plant open and not
to centralize production in Brussels. They thus revised their original
decision, which in the meantime was indeed qualified as "misman-
agement" by the Court of Amsterdam.8 So you see, there is a certain
influence the judge can have. But three years later in the Ford case
7 Decision of March 9, 1978, NEDERLANDSE JURISPRUDENTIE No. 220 (1978)
(President's Magistrate Court of Amsterdam), on appeal NEDERLANDSE JURISPRU-
DENTIE No. 70 (1980) (filed October 26, 1978 before the Court of Amsterdam).
Decision of June 21, 1979, NEDERLANDSE JURISPRUDENTIE No. 71 (1980) (Court
of Amsterdam).
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we saw a multinational company not prepared to make any conces-
sions. Could they not have conceded the fact that they
had sometime later opened a new plant in Bordeaux? Has it not been
possible to give preference to Amsterdam instead of Bordeaux? But
in the case of Ford, management was not really prepared to change
minds and make concessions. The Batco case is a good example that
the judge can have influence and, if management cooperates, it comes
to a happy end. The Ford case is the example of the opposite; if
the management does not want to cooperate, no lasting success is
possible.
I do not want to take too much of your time but I must give two
or three other examples of legislation in this field just to show you
how much the law has penetrated here. The Dutch law on dismissals
and redundancies in general is quite different from that in the United
States and most European countries because we are the only country
in the Common Market where permission from the employment office
is needed for every dismissal. That is true in the case of individual
dismissals as well as collective redundancies. So you cannot legally
dismiss a worker in Holland without a permit and if you do so
without a permit, you have to pay his salary for perhaps years and
years because the judge will not recognize the dismissal as legally
valid. But I must again immediately emphasize that the state em-
ployment office policy takes into account market forces. If a company
wants to fire its men because of the economic situation, it is obliged
to inform and consult the unions and works council, but if it has
played according to these rules and there is a reasonable cause for
the redundancy, the state employment office will issue a permit. It
will only refuse the permit if the decision is unreasonable or if
the company has neglected the procedural rules. Thus, the general
law on dismissals and redundancies in Holland plays an important
role in ensuring that companies follow the rules.
Finally, there is a so-called code on mergers and take-overs. 9 It is
not an act, but is a code like the code on multinational enterprises
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). It is not legally binding but consists of a set of moral rules
which should be applied. If management wants to merge with or
take over another company, it must inform the trade unions and the
works councils in time and bargain with them about the consequences.
9 See Mededelingenblad SER No. 43, December 9, 1975.
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If management fails to do that, there is no penalty but there is a
public rebuke. But how detrimental is public rebuke in the Dutch
newspaper, say for McDonald's, in the United States? McDonald's
presumably will not be very impressed.
All I have sketched might make you understand that there are a
lot of "legal entries" which workers, works councils, and trade unions
can use to challenge any managerial decision nowadays, including
those of foreign companies. I conclude by repeating that workers can
only expect that judges can give them breathing space, so that man-
agerial decisions might be revised. They can force management to
play according to the rules of the game but cannot expect that, in
the end, the company will remain open when there is no economic
justification.

